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ABSTRACT
Three paradoxes afflict mediation. First, if self-determination is a
psychological need motivating the parties and the mediator, how can the
parties and the mediator jointly satisfy their potentially conflicting needs?
Second, if parties are having difficulty resolving their conflicting individual
interests and incurring costs in the process, why would they invite a third
party into the conflict who has his or her own interests and adds costs? Third,
if it is impossible to guarantee that any collaborative decision making process
can be immune to manipulation by one of the participants, including the
mediator, why would parties expose themselves to the risks of mediation?
Three mutually reinforcing theories (Self-Determination Theory, Transaction
Resource Theory, and Collective Choice Theory) reveal these paradoxes. The
analysis demonstrates how professional organizations and states can resolve
the three paradoxes by crafting and enforcing mandatory standards of ethical
practice for mediators.
I. INTRODUCTION
We know how mediation works.' Do we know why? This paper proposes
an affirmative answer by drawing upon theories from the fields of
Psychology, Economics, and Political Science. However, these theories
reveal three paradoxes, leading us to question why anyone, including a
mediator, would engage in mediation. If anyone does, we conclude, it will be
because standards of ethical practice resolve the paradoxes.
* Authors listed in alphabetical order: Samuel J. Imperati, J.D.: Executive Director
Institute for Conflict Management, Inc. Portland, Oregon.
Steven M. Maser: Professor Emeritus of Public Policy and Public Management
Atkinson Graduate School of Management Willamette University, Salem, OR.
See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 248-49 (1993).
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First, from the field of psychology, mediators are called upon to help
resolve a conflict among self-determining parties who choose their own
dispute resolution processes and make their own substantive agreements.2 A
mediator is also a self-determining actor with, among other things, a
reputational stake in promoting her settlement prowess, a desire to "balance
power," or a desire to ensure the "right" outcome is achieved. Those interests
may or may not be compatible with interests of the parties in any given
mediation. Would this not give self-determining parties pause about
participating in mediation? Indeed, would this not give a self-determining
third-party pause about serving as a mediator?
Second, from the field of economics, parties negotiating a resolution
engage in a costly mixed motive game that involves conflicting incentives to
cooperate or compete. Bringing in a third party, the mediator, to assist them
introduces a second, costly, mixed motive game: this one between the parties
and the mediator, who wants the parties to settle to advance his or her own
interests. Would this not give each party and the mediator pause?
Third, from the field of political science, it is not possible to design a
process for translating individual parties' preferences into a group preference
that assures against the parties cycling interminably from one proposed
agreement to another. Even if they settle on one, the parties, and the
mediator could still have "manipulated" the process. Would this not give
each party and the mediator pause?
Given these three paradoxes, the surprise is not that mediation works as
well as it does. The surprise is that people mediate at all, even though
mediation's proponents believe it is much better than litigation in terms of
satisfying the overall interests of the participants. That mediation happens is
testimony to the mediator's judicious application of ethical rules and rhetoric
to serve the participants'-including the mediator's-psychological needs
for self-determination and for economizing on the costs of negotiating.
Judicious here means being ethical. The mediator who adheres to well-
crafted standards of practice resolves the triple paradox, improving the
parties' confidence and willingness to engage in the process. Given the
power inherent in the mediator's role, everyone's perception that the
mediator will behave ethically gives force to, and trust in, the process.
SUSAN RAINES, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FOR MANAGERS 100-41 (2013).
KENNETH ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 11 (2d ed. 1963).
This is conventional wisdom. See Using Mediation in Your Lawsuit, IDIOT'S
GUIDES, http://idiotsguides.com/static/quickguides/politicalsciencelaw/using-mediation-
in-your-lawsuit.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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We base this argument on three theories. Like mediation itself, they
originate in different disciplines. They reinforce each other to expose
common assertions' about mediation practice that are arguably erroneous:
A) parties own the outcome; mediators own the process, and B) mediators
have no preferences over outcomes.
Section II of this paper outlines the three theories (Self-Determination
Theory, Transaction Resource Theory, and Collective Choice Theory), the
resulting paradoxes, and associated remedial standards of ethical practice.
We will refer to the guidelines embodied in the Oregon Mediation
Association Core Standards of Mediation Practice (OMA Standards in the
following text) for resolving them.6 Our analysis allows us to derive criteria
for standards of practice that can breed more confidence in mediation, much
as a reputation can breed more confidence in a particular mediator.
These assertions may be a result of the "availability cascade" cognitive bias. It is
the "self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility
through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or, repeat something long enough
and it will become true)." See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades
and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1998).
See generally OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, OREGON MEDIATION
ASSOCIATION CORE STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE (2005), available at
http://www.omediate.org/pg6l.cfm. The American Arbitration Association, American
Bar Association, and the Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR) adopted their
"Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators" ("Joint Code") in 2005 as well. MODEL
STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS (American Arbitration Ass'n et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.acmet.org/uploadedFiles/Practitioner/ModelStandardsofConductforMediators
final05(1)(1).pdf. The Oregon Mediation Association changed many of its provisions
when adopting the OMA Standards to add further detail and qualify some of the practical
challenges it believed the Joint Code created for the practitioner in the field. The authors
suggest both codes should be modified to attend to the issues raised herein.
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 1.The OMA Standards
Preamble notes the complexity and diversity of the field with, "These Core Standards
recognize that the role of mediator is complex, individual practice areas vary, and a full
spectrum of personal, professional, and cultural diversity surrounds mediator approaches.
These differences are valuable. These Core Standards should not be construed to favor or
disfavor any particular approach." Id. Because mediation is evolving, the Preamble also
notes its provisions "are not intended to dictate conduct in a particular situation, define
'competency,' establish 'best practices,' or create a 'standard of care.' They are not
intended to be disciplinary rules." Id. Finally, the Preamble recognizes the
interdisciplinary nature of the field. It states, "When these Core Standards conflict with or
are silent on subjects covered by applicable laws, regulations, professional licensing
rules, professional ethical codes, or contracts by which the mediator may be bound,
mediators should be aware and make participants and others in attendance aware that
those requirements may take precedence over these Core Standards." Id.
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First, self-determination theory (SDT) explains the motivation for
anyone to participate in mediation.8 In our application of SDT to mediation,
it is not that the parties necessarily trust the mediator, who empowers and
protects them so they can reveal information essential for satisfying their
underlying interests. Rather, mediating helps the parties and the mediator
satisfy their innate psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and
relatedness, which are necessary conditions for their psychological growth,
integrity, and well-being. Second, transaction resource theory (TRT) explains
the conditions under which parties will turn to a third-party to explore
resolution.9 In our application of TRT to mediation, reaching agreement
requires each individual to deal with contradictory pressures. They are: A)
the costs of making concessions and complying with the terms of an
agreement (militate against making an agreement) versus B) the benefits of
reducing conflict and inducing others to cooperate (militate in favor of
making it.) Mediators can supplement the resources parties exhaust in
managing these pressures, even after accounting for the costs of introducing
the mediator. Third, collective choice theory (CCT) explains the
impossibility of guaranteeing against someone manipulating the process
when members of a group, such as two or more parties in conflict with the
addition of a mediator, attempt to reach agreement be it on process or
substance. 10 In our application of CCT to mediation, a mediator's
involvement in defining the process and in framing or refraining arguments
and proposals cannot avoid being manipulative. CCT identifies the
conditions under which parties could condone this.
Section III of this paper outlines the strategic "manipulations" that are
tools of the mediator's trade: A) Heresthetics (Politics), and B) Rhetoric
(Persuasive Discourse). We discuss them in the context of SDT, TRT and
CCT, and the applicable ethical standards.
Section IV outlines recommendations to assist organizations setting out
to create and revise their standards of conduct. We also argue for changing
most, if not all, mediator standards from guidelines to enforceable
expectations of conduct.
8See generally Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The "What" and "Why" of
Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 227, 227-268 (2000).
See Jules Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 681-82 (1989).
10
See JOHN BONNER, POLITICS, ECONOMICs AND WELFARE: AN ELEMENTARY
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CHOICE 59-60 (1986).
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II. THEORIES, PARADOXES AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
We provide the following overview table" of the theories, paradoxes and
associated ethical practices:
Theory Paradox Ethics
A) Self- The more the mediator Self-
Determination maximizes the parties' Determination
Theory self-determination, the
less the mediator satisfies Informed
her own. consent
B) Transaction Parties exhaust their Impartial
Resource transaction resources in Regard
Theory resolving their individual
interests, yet they invite a Confidentiality
third party into the
conflict with his or her
own interests.
C) Collective It is impossible to design a Self-
Choice process for translating Determination
Theory individual parties'
preferences into a group Impartial
preference that guarantees Regard
the parties will not cycle
interminably among Good-Faith
possible outcomes. Participation
Informed
Consent
Table 1
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A. Self-Determination Theory and Paradox 1
Self-determination is a cornerstone of mediation.' 2 What does "self-
determination" mean? To Bush and Folger, it means a relational concept of
human identity based on two perceptions:
As a matter of basic human consciousness, every person senses that he or
she is a separate, autonomous agent authoring her or his own life, and at
the same time senses that that he or she is an inherently social being,
connected to other people in an essential and not just instrumental
fashion. 1
We read this to mean, to the extent that conflict diminishes an individual's
perceptions of his or her autonomy and connectedness, it compromises the
individual's sense of identity. This deficit motivates the individual's effort to
change the conflict interaction, with or without a third party's assistance, to
try to regain a sense of humanity.
Bush and Folger's description of self-determination is problematic. They
use the terms "individual agency" and "individuality" to explain what they
mean by "separate, autonomous agent, authoring his or her own life." This
confounds the notion of an individual's psychological need for a sense of
"independence," meaning distinctiveness, with the notion of an individual's
psychological need for a sense of "volition," meaning ability to choose. What
Bush and Folger mean by "connected to other people in an essential . . .
fashion" is less clear, but apparently, it has to do with a need for an
"understanding between human beings." 4 This confounds the notion of an
individual's psychological need to have a sense of belonging with an
individual's psychological need for empathy.
Self-Determination Theory, a well-articulated, internally coherent, and
empirically grounded theory of human psychology corrects these
confounds.'"It improves the foundation on which mediation practice can
build. Its precepts are:
12 Samuel J. Imperati et al., If Freud, Jung, Rogers and Beck Were Mediators, Who
Would the Parties Pick and What are the Mediator's Obligations?, 43 IDAHO L. REV.
645, 647 (2007).
13 Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Transformative Mediation:
Theoretical Foundations, in TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION: A SOURCEBOOK 22 (Joseph
P. Folger et al. eds., 2010).
14 Dorothy J. Della Noce, Seeing Theory in Practice: An Analysis of Empathy in
Mediation, 15 NEGOTIATIONJ. 271, 273 (1999).
15 iDeci & Ryan, supra note 8, at 227-68.
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* the natural orientation of humans is to grow, integrating their psychic
elements into a unified sense of self and into larger social structures;
* acting on the environment rather than passively awaiting a
disequilibrium; 6
* extrinsic rewards and other environmental conditions catalyze self-
motivation; and
* psychological well-being to the extent that they satisfy innate
psychological needs.17
Consistent with Bush and Folger, Deci and Ryan define a psychological
"need" as an organismic necessity, neither an acquired motive nor learned.
In contrast to Bush and Folger, who imply two needs, Deci and Ryan
posit three:19
* Competence is "a propensity to have an effect on the environment as
well as to attain valued outcomes within it."20 It speaks to senses of
efficacy and mastery.
* Relatedness "refers to the desire to feel connected to others-to love
and care, and to be loved and cared for." 21 It speaks to senses of
belonging and security.
* Autonomy "refers to volition-the desire to self-organize experience
and behavior and to have activity be concordant with one's
integrated sense of self."22 As opposed to a sense of being in control
or independent, it speaks to the senses of freedom and inner
coherence.2 3
The degree of need can differ from person to person. For psychological
growth, integrity, and well-being, people require psychological nutrients for
all three; satisfying one or two is not sufficient.24 Different individual goals
and processes are associated with different degrees of need satisfaction; the
needs themselves are universal, if not invariant.2 5 Satisfying these needs
intrinsically motivates behavior without requiring separable consequences.2 6
16Id at 229-30.
1
7 Id. at 227.
18Id at 229.
Id at 228.
2 0Id.at 231.
21 Deci & Ryan, supra note 8.
22
22Id.
23
Id. at 229.
24
25 1d. at 232.
26 Id at 234.
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Thus, a party in mediation who appears to be pursuing self-interest in
terms of an extrinsic outcome, like maximizing a payout, is expressing an
intrinsic need for competence: to have an effect on the environment and to
attain a valued outcome within it. A party who appears to be righting a
wrong, exacting retribution, or seeking fairness can be expressing a need for
relatedness, to feel connected to others, or autonomy; "to have [an] activity
be concordant with one's integrated sense of self."2 7 To address these needs,
a mediator might ask one party to be "fairer" than another party, to take the
higher ground, if you will.
In these terms, the goal of mediation is to satisfy the parties' innate
needs, eliciting by their own actions an agreement to which they can commit,
effectuate, and, ideally, improve their relationship.
The adversarial process in a judicial setting compromises the parties'
self-determination. It undermines their feeling competent because it requires
agents with legal expertise. It undermines their feeling related because it
alienates the parties. It undermines their feeling autonomous because
decisions by others largely control the process and the outcome. Mediation,
in contrast, provides ambient supports for the parties to experience
competence, relatedness, and autonomy because they control the process and
outcome.
This brings us to the first of three paradoxes bedeviling mediation: the
more a mediator maximizes the parties' self-determination, the more the
mediator appears to minimize his or her own. Mediators are self-
determining, too. They talk about solving problems, which speaks to a need
for competence; about being held in high regard and helping others, which
speaks to a need for relatedness; and about improving situations and adding
value, which speaks to a need for autonomy, that is, a sense of volition. If the
parties determine the process and the outcome, for example, then the
mediator does not, diminishing the mediator's sense of competence,
relatedness, and autonomy.28 This would seem to be a source of ambivalence
27Deci & Ryan, supra note 8, at 231.
28 This dynamic comes into focus when the mediator uses caucuses. Information
control, presentation of arguments, and case evaluation are partially transferred from the
parties to the mediator. The situation is further complicated by the mediator's
confidentiality obligations. They prevent her from disclosing all of the facts and
perspectives that are influencing her selective disclosures and evaluation. In essence, the
mediator is saying, "trust me-I'm a smart and ethical professional." However, this
creates the opportunity for manipulation, even if usually benevolent, and can lead to
distrust of shuttle diplomacy. The return to a joint session only model can be a de facto
minimization of the mediator's self-determination. It is, however, more consistent with
the societal megatrend of transparency in decision-making. See Jeffrey Makoff & Jessica
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for the mediator, and therefore for the parties about engaging in mediation.
How, then, to resolve the paradox?
First, organizations that promote mediation operationalize SDT in their
standards and in the comments that elucidate each one. The Oregon
Mediation Association's Standard 1 is labeled "Self-Determination." It reads,
"Mediators respect, value, and encourage the ability of each participant to
make individual decisions regarding what process to use and whether and on
what terms to resolve the dispute."2 9 Comment 1 following Standard 1
captures what Deci and Ryan mean by autonomous, defining "self-
determination" to mean that participants "should be free to choose their own
dispute resolution process, and mediators should encourage them to make
their own decisions on all issues."3 o
Comment 2, while making the participants' autonomy explicit,
operationalizes Deci and Ryan's notion of relatedness by using the phrase
"collaborative interaction." The Comment states, "Mediators respect the
culture, beliefs, rights, and autonomy of the participants. Mediators should
defer their own views to those of the participants . . . recognizing that the
collaborative interaction between the participants is often the key to
resolution." Comment 5 references the benefits of the process and a
potential agreement, one of which is to improve the relationship between the
parties, reinforcing relatedness: "Mediators should encourage participants to
consider the benefits of mediation and agreement, as well as the
consequences of non-participation and non-agreement., 32
By introducing the notion of "Informed Consent,"33 Comments 3, 4 and 6
operationalize Deci and Ryan's notion of competence.
3. Mediators should educate participants about the continuum of
mediation approaches 34 and identify the approaches the mediator
Grynberg, "Private Caucusing" In Civil Pretrial Mediations, MEDIATE.COM,
http://www.mediate.com/articles/MakoffJ1.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
29
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at std. I.
30
Id. at cmt. 1.
3' Id. at cmt. 2.
32 Id. at cmt. 5.
33 Id. Standard II, Informed Consent, states, in part, "To fully support Self-
Determination, mediators respect, value, and encourage participants to exercise Informed
Consent throughout the mediation process. This involves making decisions about process,
as well as substance, including possible options for resolution . . . ." Id.
Id at std. 1, cmt. 3. The term "Approach" is used in these Core Standards to signify
"... the behaviors, philosophies, processes, styles, and techniques used by mediators to
conduct mediation." Id.
231
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
practices. Engaging the participants in a discussion to establish expectations
about these approaches will help the participants give their Informed
Consent to the approach best suited for their particular situation.
4. While a mediator cannot ensure that participants are making
informed and voluntary decisions, mediators should help participants
understand the process, issues, and options before them and encourage
participants to make informed and voluntary decisions...
6. Participation in mediation is usually a voluntary process. Even
when mediation is "mandatory," participants who are unable or unwilling to
participate effectively in the mediation process should be free to suspend or
withdraw from mediation. Mediators should respect a participant's
informed decision to continue or end the process. 35
Indeed, Comment 5 on Standard 2, "Informed Consent," directs
mediators to "make ongoing, good-faith efforts to assess the freedom and
ability of each participant to make choices..." and to "suspend, end, or
withdraw from the mediation if they believe a participant is unable to give
'Informed Consent."36 If the OMA's standards of practice operationalize self-
determination for the parties, how do they reconcile this with self-
determination for the mediator?
First, Comment 2 on Standard 1 directs mediators to subordinate their
"views." If Deci and Ryan are correct, mediators can more easily
subordinate their views, which are mechanisms to satisfy their three needs,
than they can subordinate those needs, which drive mediators
psychologically as much as they do everyone else. Additionally, according to
OMA Standard 3, the mediator should decline to serve or withdraw if it
requires sufficient subordination to affect their "Impartial Regard."38 OMA
standards in effect advise the mediator and the parties that the mediator will
satisfy his or her needs by reinforcing the self-determination of the parties.
Second, Standard 2 on informed consent not only acknowledges that
mediators have needs; it also creates the expectation that each party will engage
the mediator on the mediator's terms, but only with consent.39 It directs the
mediator to secure each party's informed consent to use the specific mediator
and the mediator's articulated approach to mediation. It says, "Initially and
throughout the mediation process, mediators further support Self-Determination
by making appropriate disclosures about themselves and the specific mediation
OREGON MEDIATION AssocIATIoN, supra note 6, at std, I, cmt. 6.
36 Id. at std. 1I, cmt. 5.
See id. at std. I, cmt. 2.
38 See id. at std. III.
See id. at std. II.
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approaches they use."40 Comment 4 on Standard 2 directs mediators to ". . .
disclose information regarding conflicts of interest, fees, relevant relationships,
process competency, and substantive knowledge of the subject matter in
dispute. Mediator disclosure should be truthful and not misleading by
omission."4' Presumably, informed participants will select a different mediator
or a different process if they decide that the mediator, as indicated in these
disclosures, will jeopardize their individual and collaborative goals. If they do
not make an alternative selection, then by implication, the mediation can
proceed in ways that address the mediator's needs without his or her
subordinating them to the needs of the parties.
Third, mediators have a say in this. Standard 5, "Process and Substantive
Competence," directs them to "mediate only when they offer the desired
approach and possess the level of substantive knowledge, skills and abilities
sufficient to satisfy the participants' reasonable expectations."42 Comment 1
on this Standard directs mediators to "exercise their independent judgment
when their abilities or availability are unlikely to satisfy the participants'
articulated expectations." 4 3 Mediators make their own determinations to
mediate as autonomous actors, based on their competent judgment, and the
nature of relationships with the parties, but only after Informed Consent.
Indeed, this Comment would be more helpful if it clarified what it means
when it says that mediators should "consider factors such as the participants
involved . . . " when exercising their independent judgment." Because
another factor is ". . . their agreed-upon mediation approach,"A we presume
this direction acknowledges, if not addresses, the mediator's need for
relatedness and acknowledges the professional goal of subordination to the
participants. In sum, OMA's Standards recognize and operationalize
everyone's need for self-determination, including mediators', resolving the
first paradox, but why not make this point more specifically and provide
more guidance in the Comments?
B. Transaction Resource Theory and Paradox 2
What, though, do the parties in conflict expect mediators to do? What
should mediators do? For answers, we turn to transaction resource theory
40140Id.
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at std. II, cmt. 4.
42 Id. at std. V.
3Id. at std. V, cmt. 1.
44 Id.
Id.
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(TRT), which is informed by the economics of information, by the game-
theoretic structures of most conflicts, and, therefore, by the parties'
incentives.46 We apply TRT to both substantive and process agreements,
including agreements to mediate. It predicates that people incur transaction
costs to overcome imperfect information.47 The imperfections derive from
complex mixtures of what Max Weber terms "opposed and complementary
interests" in-group decision-making. 48 These place distinct information
demands on the parties.
We characterize the relationship among disputants as a configuration of
individual interests called a divisible prisoner's dilemma game. In the simple
prisoner's dilemma game, parties negotiating on their own know that
cooperating to find a mutually agreeable solution can yield a better outcome
than not cooperating.49 However, each party also has an incentive to act in a
self-interested way that undermines cooperation if the other party cooperates,
which generates the best result for the non-cooperator and the worst result for
the cooperator.50 Simply stated, they do not trust each other, so the incentive
not to cooperate prevails.
This presents its players with two decision-making problems: (1)
coordination, wherein individuals identify mutually beneficial processes and
outcomes and synchronize their behavior to attain them; and (2) defection,
wherein the parties deter free-riding so that an individual acting in his or her
own self-interest will not get discordant and jeopardize the parties attaining
mutual benefits. 52 The divisible prisoner's dilemma incorporates a third
decision-making problem: division, wherein members of the group must
bargain to allocate among themselves the benefits and risks of cooperating."
The divisible prisoner's dilemma is a richer and more realistic model of
relationships in conflict.
Each of the three decision-making problems creates distinct
informational demands 54 People expend resources on searching for
46 See generally Coleman et al., supra note 9.
47 See id. at 651.
48
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATION 136 (Talcott
Parsons & A.M. Henderson trans., 1947) ("The purest cases of associative relationships
are: (a) rational free market exchange, which constitutes a compromise of opposed but
complementary interests .
49 See Coleman et al., supra note 9, at 666-67.
50See id.
51 See id. at 666.
52 See id. at 654-55.
53 See id. at 661.
54 Id. at 653.
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alternatives when they do not know which ones create gains, that is, are
feasible; on bargaining when they do not know which ones they can agree to
as equitable; and on monitoring when they do not know which ones are
enforceable. s In a coordination problem, the parties share a common
interest, which encourages them to pool whatever relevant knowledge they
each possess to identify the best plan for cooperating to find a solution to the
conflict. 56 When coordination combines with division problems,
communications can no longer be taken at face value." Bargainers benefit
from suppressing or distorting information about potential process options
and substantive outcomes58 For example, exaggerating the value of their own
alternatives or understating the value of alternatives available to the
opponent. When coordination problems combine with enforcement problems,
more difficulties arise. The problem of deterring defection from agreement is
compounded by two other problems: 1) identifying enforcement mechanisms
that are sufficiently expansive and efficient to plug loopholes, but also
restrictive enough to deter defection, and 2) allocating the cost of
enforcement. 59 Each of the problems can vary in magnitude.
To resolve the defection problem, the parties create a "force of
agreement."60 That is, they either block opportunities to defect or impose
disincentives that are sufficient to deter defection.6 ' The parties can only
secure gains from cooperating if they can agree first on the terms for sharing
the cost of creating and maintaining the enforcement system. The simple
prisoner's dilemma game during conflict becomes a sequence of bargaining
62games. The parties will be unsure about agreeing on terms without first
agreeing on a force of agreement,63 but also unsure about agreeing on a force
55 See Coleman et al., supra note 9, at 657
56 See id. at 654-55.
57 157Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 666.
60 Id. at 669.
Coleman et al., supra note 9, at 668.
62 Id. at 672.
63
This is less of a concern when mediating within the shadow of the court system
where enforcement mechanisms are already in place. It is more an issue for public policy
cases that are mediated in the shadow of the political process where elected or appointed
third parties often decide whether to accept, implement, and enforce mediated
agreements. A mediator typically leads disparate parties to prepare recommendations for
a sponsor who has the authority to implement them. The more the parties can rely upon
the sponsor to act consistent with the parties' recommendations, the more the parties can
focus on the substantive deal.
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of agreement when they do not know whether they will be able to reach
agreement on terms.64
Consistent with SDT, we assume that people prefer to resolve these
problems on their own. We also assume that people usually have transaction
resources among themselves to resolve these problems without involving a
third party. Transaction resources include communication channels, sources
of information, information processing capacities, time, money, and the
ability to monitor compliance and sanction noncompliance. 6 5
The demand for third-party involvement, including mediation or courts,
arises where relationships are so complex or otherwise fraught that
limitations in the group's stock of available transaction resources block
process or substantive agreement.6 6 For example, the parties have insufficient
information to overcome their distrust for each other, or to avoid
psychological traps that result from their cognitive limitations such as the
Availability Heuristic6 or the Over-confidence Effect. 68 Addressing these
insufficiencies and traps drain their stock of transaction resources.
A third party can augment the transaction resources already present in
the relationship, or it can provide resources that are deficient.69 Judicial
institutions, however costly they may be, can be more efficient at enforcing
agreements than self-enforcement.7 By relying on precedent, for example,
the courts create predictability in resolving disputes so parties can devote
their scarce transaction resources to making substantive agreements. A
mediator can improve communication to help the parties identify solutions.7'
In our experience, unlike a judge, a mediator usually is not authorized to
enforce an agreement, but a selected mediator brings resources that an
assigned judge might not: substantive expertise, expert risk evaluation,
creativity, party face-saving, and more time to attend to the parties'
psychological reactions.
In theory then, parties in conflict demand different types and degrees of
intervention (facilitation, mediation, arbitration, litigation) depending on the
64 Coleman et al., supra note 9, at 672-73.
65 Id. at 679-80.
Id. at 681-82.
67 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
(Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
69 Coleman et al., supra note 9, at 682.
70 Id. at 68 1.
71 d at 682.
236
[Vol.29:2 2014]
WHY DOES ANYONE MEDIATE
deficiency in their internal transaction resources. This can range from
relatively passive facilitators who keep time and encourage individual
participation, to relatively aggressive problem-solvers who propose
agreements. 7 Consistent with SDT, effective mediators craft their
interventions to remedy the specific deficiencies in the transaction resources
among the particular parties, which is what generates an expectation by the
parties that a mediator can help them.
This brings us to the second of three paradoxes bedeviling mediation:
introducing a third-party creates a second divisible prisoner's dilemma
game, one between the mediator and the parties in conflict, with resulting
increased transaction costs. Restated, parties exhaust their transaction
resources in resolving their individual interests, yet they invite a third party
into the conflict with his or her own interests. Before the mediator begins
mediating, the parties, including the mediator, should agree on the approach
to mediation (e.g., transformative, facilitative, or evaluative), which requires
its own force of agreement. Everyone, including the third-party, has an
incentive to cooperate in selecting and following a process for finding an
agreeable solution, if one exists. However, everyone, including the mediator,
has opportunities to behave in a self-interested manner that could undermine
cooperation. For instance, the parties might benefit from an evaluative
approach but the mediator being considered does not practice it.74
The range of transaction resources the mediator brings to the table
becomes his or her source of power, not only during the mediation, but also
in the decision about process.75 In this view, the mediator's power, authority,
and legitimacy derive from the value the parties in conflict place on the
mediator's transaction resources.76 The question is what are the conditions, if
any, under which all parties, including the mediator, would agree that the
mediator may exercise independent judgment because it is in all of their
interests for this to happen?77
Asked in terms of OMA's standards, when might the parties give their
informed consent, consistent with Standard 2, to a mediator exercising
independent judgment, such as being a type of evaluative mediator,
72 See id. at 685-86.
See id.
To the extent that mediation is more art than science, successful mediators bring
their experience and discerning wisdom to the table, often as "advocates for resolution."
Parties often consider this a "value-added" proposition.
See Coleman et al., supra note 9, at 683.
76
Id.
77
See generally Omer Shapira, A Theory of Sharing Decision-Making in Mediation,
44 MCGEORGE L. REv. 923 (2013).
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remaining consistent with Standard 3 on Impartial Regard?78 TRT asks, what
constitutes "full" and "informed?" 79 The more the mediator discloses and the
more informed the parties become, the more costly it is and the less likely
they are to participate in mediation. Mediators have to balance their behavior,
as OMA's standards direct.80
This is a basic coordination problem between the mediator and the
parties.8 1 The solution is the behavior preferred by everyone that allows a
mediator to function, applying his or her transaction resources. Moreover, a
mediator's ability to terminate the mediation, just like each party's ability to
withdraw from it, provides a force of agreement that helps to resolve the
divisible prisoner's dilemma between the mediator and the parties.
OMA's Standards capture this in Standard 3: Impartial Regard, and
Standard 4: Confidentiality. 82 If they act in accord with Standard 3, mediators
will conduct mediations, "diligently, even-handedly, and with no personal
stake in the outcome."8 Standard 3 does not call for the mediator to be
"neutral" or "impartial," because they have points of view. The Standard
focuses on the mediator's behavior even though it does not define what it
means by mediating "even-handedly."84 This is not unusual and it affords
mediators a degree of discretion.s Comments 1 and 2 require the mediator to
identify and disclose conflicts of interest that might lead the mediator to
benefit at the expense of the parties. In Comment 3, mediators should
consider not serving in "situations where the mediator's ability to
demonstrate Impartial Regard is compromised or appears to be compromised
78 See OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6.
79 See Coleman et al., supra note 9, at 683-84.
80 See OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6.
81
Id
82 Id. at stds. III-IV.
83 Id. at std. III.
84 See id. In practice, mediator behavior will be affected by the mediator's training,
rules governing practice in the jurisdiction, "best practices," ideology, and many other
personal and situational factors. In some decision-making contexts, decision-makers
prefer biased sources of information to neutral ones. Randall L. Calvert, The Value of
Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice, 47 J. POL. 530, 533
(1985). In the context of international disputes, highly biased, powerful interveners can
induce agreements that unbiased third parties cannot, but in other contexts, impartial third
parties behaving as mediator are more effective. See Katja Favretto, Should Peacemakers
Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias, 103 AM. POL. SC. REv. 248
(2009).
85 Susan Nauss Exon, How can a Mediator be both Impartial and Fair? Why Ethical
Standards Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DisP. REsOL. 387, 401-402 (2006).
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at std. III, cmts. 1-2.
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because of the mediator's personal biases, views, or reactions to any position,
argument, participant representative, or ... person."87 Likewise, a mediator
who is over-focused on her reputation as one who settles cases could violate
this Standard if she pushes for settlement in situations where the parties are
not inclined to settle, but rather for the mediator's advocacy.
Similarly, Comment 3 on Standard 4 reads, "Mediators who meet with
participants in private during mediation should not convey confidential
mediation communications without the prior consent of the disclosing
participant."8 8 The expectation in Standard 4 that a mediator will respect
confidentiality as he or she creates communication channels does not
guarantee against a mediator using strategically the information gained in
confidence; that is, to influence either the process or the formulation of
possible outcomes. To the extent that the parties can discover this and find it
objectionable, their ability to withdraw mitigates the likelihood of a mediator
doing it.
In sum, OMA's Standards of Practice operationalize everyone's
incentives, including the mediator's, to use mutually agreed upon transaction
resources efficiently, responding to the complex pressures and claims that
arise. The Standards frame everyone's expectations about the mediator's
application of transaction resources. Given everyone's ability to withdraw if
they believe another is violating these expectations, the Standards provide
common reference points for invoking a force of agreement. This resolves
the divisible prisoner's dilemma between them, the second paradox, but
perhaps the Standards should be more specific about the practical reality that
the mediator's mere presence impacts the autonomy of the parties, adds
costs, and influences both process and outcome.
C. Collective Choice Theory and Paradox 3
Collective choice theory (CCT) proves what SDT predicts: because both
process and content impact the satisfaction of the three psychological needs,
"covariation between content and process will typically occur."89 Practice
confirms that content and process-whether support, guidance, evaluation, or
transformation-are inseparable. 90 More correctly, guaranteeing their
separation is impossible. Every group decision-making process is susceptible
to manipulation by any participant, including the mediator. Indeed, parties do
87 Id. at std. III, cmt. 3.
88 OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at std. IV, cmt. 4.
89 Deci & Ryan, supra note 8, at 246.
90
Shapira, supra note 77.
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not always want to settle and might engage in mediation simply for strategic
purposes.9 1
Arrow's theorem, a mathematical proof, applies to any process that a
group can design. 92 Formally, Arrow started with a set of axioms about
individual choice, which amounts to a definition of rational behavior, to
design axioms about rational group choice. According to his proof, it is
impossible to design a process for a group to make a choice that guarantees
an outcome as rational as choices made by its individual members. 93 This
Third paradox is called Arrow's Paradox. Put differently, if a group reaches
a durable process or substantive decision, as opposed to cycling indecisively
among alternatives, we cannot guarantee that the group decision will be
independent of the method by which it was chosen. 94 Thus, process
influences outcome.
Are Arrow's axioms plausible?95 The axioms describing individual
choice include:
* Connectivity (people can compare goods, services, or proposals; they
can assess whether they prefer ice cream, cake, or candy)
* Transitivity (people can rank their preferences logically; if an
individual prefers vanilla ice cream to chocolate, and chocolate to
strawberry, then the individual will prefer vanilla to strawberry)
* Invariance (the ranking assigned to the most preferred alternative
does not change if a less preferred alternative becomes unavailable; if an
individual prefers vanilla to both chocolate and strawberry and also prefers
chocolate to strawberry, then if strawberry is not available, the individual still
prefers and will choose vanilla).
* Dominance (the order matters, not how much value one assigns to
the items; on a hot day when any flavor of ice cream might provide more
satisfaction than on a cool rainy day, the choice will be governed by the same
ranking).
* Individual Decisiveness (the individual makes the ranking; no one
else dictates the choice of flavor)
91
Craig McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to Effective
Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 1, 25 (1998).
92
ARROW, supra note 3.
93
94 WILLIAM RIKER, THE ART OF POLICAL MANIPULATION 142 (1986).
95
JOHN BONNER, POLmCs, EcONOMICs, AND WELFARE: AN ELEMENTARY
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CHANGE, 56-71 (1986).
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This compact set of axioms, the basis for modem economics, seems
uncontroversial, even necessary, to understand and predict individual
decisions, including during mediation.
Arrow asked whether an analogous set of axioms can describe how a
group reaches a decision. He proved that it cannot. If a group tries to decide
which flavor ice cream all would order using a process in accord with these
axioms, they likely would go hungry. If they leave with ice cream cones in
hand, someone probably behaved in a way that violated one of the axioms.
On our analysis, CCT is consistent with Self-Determination Theory
(SDT). CCT assumes individuals can be characterized by sets of values and
tastes. In SDT, parties innately value competency, autonomy, and
relatedness. CCT assumes that: (1) a set of alternative outcomes exists; (2)
each party can rank them on one or more dimensions, and (3) the dimensions
are standards for assessing the relevant properties of the outcomes. In SDT,
the existence of alternative outcomes is part of the environment in which
individuals act, given their competence in assessing the properties of the
alternatives. CCT assumes individuals can exercise choice consistent with
their preferences. In SDT, individuals make choices to satisfy their needs for
autonomy, or their inward coherence, and competence, or their ability to
attain valued outcomes. Finally, CCT establishes conditions under which a
group will reach a decision without cycling interminably among alternatives,
including the behavior by a mediator to help bring one about. In SDT, people
value decisiveness over group indecisiveness because decisiveness promotes
the senses of security and belonging that help to fulfill their need for
relatedness.
Being based in classical economics and concepts from non-cooperative
game theory, CCT carries their inherent limitations. Economic theory cannot
explain decisions by characterizing how individuals make interpersonal
comparisons of utility, which in practice they do. We see it when parties
arrive at solutions they perceive to be "fair" and refuse solutions that they
perceive to be "unfair," even if both are made better off, something classical
economics cannot fathom. That does not mean these decisions are irrational.
It requires using different concepts of rationality, such as those in
cooperative game theory.9 7 Nonetheless, CCT can inform our understanding
of the risks parties take when mediators do what they do best, using tactics
that can be shown in theory to violate one or more of Arrow's axioms.
96
If a mediation process reinforces individual autonomy and competence, it might
increase the likelihood of indecision. If a mediation process reinforces relatedness,
making the utility of one party a function of the utility of another, it might reduce it.
97 John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. OF POL. Eco. 309 (1955).
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Arrow's Theorem thus presents the third of the three paradoxes
bedeviling mediation. To experience it, the group need have as few as three
people and three issues, which could describe even the simplest mediation
that involves a mediator and two parties. The larger the number of parties
involved, as in public policy matters, the more likely the outcome will follow
from the rules of the process or be indecisive.9 8 If everyone knows this, why
would anyone engage in any form of group decision-making, including
mediation?
Yet, they do. Moreover, we observe mediation leading to decisions to
participate. One reason people might participate is that the alternative
processes are even more problematic. Another is that a mediator's tactics
bring the group to agreement, albeit by testing, if not violating, one or
another of the seemingly plausible axioms that Arrow imposes on the
process. Nevertheless, the parties must find the cost of the mediator's
behavior to be preferable to the alternative forms of intervention or
nonintervention.
This brings us back to the OMA standards of practice and the need to
agree on process to implement self-determination in mediation.99 Mediators
should provide full disclosure for the participants to give informed consent.
This will increase the chances of good faith participation and the mediator
acting with impartial regard. The discussion surrounding the applicability of
those mediator standards appears at the end of "Section III Common
Mediator Tactics," below.
If Arrow is correct, "impartial regard" is contingent and affords
mediators discretion. That is not necessarily a bad thing. It means that
mediators are making tradeoffs, or, perhaps, simply recognizing a certain
acceptance of and rationality in common, illogical decisions. The group gets
a decision, for example, which has value independent of the merits of the
decision. Mediators try to justify their acting instrumentally, but the
Standards could make clear that a mediator's involvement in shaping the
98 See ARROW, supra note 3. Arrow's result does not say that if a group of three or
more reaches a decision, it has been dictated. It says that it is impossible to guarantee
against someone strategically manipulating the process to arrive at a decision. One
wonders whether a mediator respectful of the parties' need to feel competent,
autonomous, and related should explain the implications of Arrow's work to the parties
before inviting them to design their process. As it is, each participant is all too eager to
assume that the other participant is the one being manipulative. Surely, explaining the
implications of Arrow's work should make all of them unsure about participating in
mediation. The issue for the mediator is whether she has an ethical obligation to explain
this to the parties before they decide to mediate.
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6.
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process and in framing arguments and proposals cannot help but be
manipulative even when done with benevolent intent.
The next section outlines the strategic "manipulations" that are tools of
the mediator's trade: A) Heresthetics (Political Strategy), and B) Rhetoric
(Persuasive Discourse).'00 We discuss them in the context of SDT, TRT and
CCT, and the applicable ethical standards. The lesson of our analysis is that
people should assess the risks of engaging in mediation, no matter how well
intentioned. Well-crafted standards of practice minimize those risks.
III. COMMON MEDIATOR TACTICS
Of the three paradoxes, Arrow's may appear to be the least relevant to
the practice of mediation. It might be the most difficult to fathom. However,
it might be the most applicable, as well.
By way of elaboration, consider tactics mediators commonly employ to
help parties in conflict. In our experience mediator "tactics" are often
designed specifically to influence the choices, the ranking, and the intensity
of preferences of the parties. When they use these tactics, mediators often
refer euphemistically to "reality testing" or "balancing power." They tend to
do this when they think a party is not thinking "correctly" about a topic.
Mediators seldom find the need to do it when they agree with the parties.
We assign these tactics to two categories: heresthetic and rhetoric.
Starting with heresthetics, we will explain why they work, which is to say,
why they violate Arrow's axioms, and why the parties might allow mediators
to manipulate them in these ways.
100
See Douglas Frenkel & James Stark, Changing Minds: The Work of Mediators
and Empirical Studies ofPersuasion, 28 OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL. 263 (2013). Frenkel
and Stark explore the research surrounding "persuasive effectiveness" in advertising,
disease prevention, race relations and politics, and suggest similar research is needed in
the context of mediation. They note that mediators "reframe" the word "persuasion" to
"problem-solving," and suggest, as did Deborah Kolb and Kenneth Kressel, that
mediators are prone to "engage in a "kind of denial about what they do." See Deborah M.
Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Realities of Making Talk Work, in WHEN TALK WORKS:
PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 459, 483 ( Deborah M. Kolb ed., 1994). We agree. Frenkel and
Stark conclude mediation-specific research will inform the mediation field's views on the
long-standing debates surrounding the mediator's necessary level of subject matter
expertise to effectively mediate, and the iconic "facilitative-evaluative" debate we call
"mischegas."
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A. Heresthetic Tactics
1. Process Issues
Heresthetics refers to "structuring the world so you can win."'ot is
related to rhetoric but involves more that verbal persuasion. It involves
setting up a situation so that other people will want or feel compelled by
circumstances to cooperate, even without persuasion.
According to SDT and TRT, a mediator in support of self-determination
should engage the parties in a collaborative discussion and ultimately a
decision to select mediation and the mediator's approach.10 2 Assume two
parties and the mediator try to decide on these. Their options are
transformation, evaluation or facilitative; assume for simplicity that someone
capable of implementing a "hybrid" approach is unavailable. 03
Table 2 gives their preferences. They are rational. The mediator has
preferences, too.
Rank:
First Second Third
Participant:
Party 1 Evaluation Facilitation Transformation
Party 2 Facilitation Transformation Evaluation
Mediator Transformation Evaluation Facilitation
Table 2
Indeed, a practitioner of transformative mediation would want to
empower the parties, reinforcing their self-determination by engaging them
in designing the process-if that is what the parties want.' If it was up to
the disputants only, they have opposing preferences on transformation versus
evaluation. They only agree that they both prefer facilitation to
101
RIKER supra note 94, at ix. Heresthetics should not be confused with "heuristics,"
which are mental shortcuts that people use to solve problems and make judgments
quicker and more efficiently. Heuristic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/heuristic (last visited May 12, 2014). These "rules of thumb" can
lead to cognitive biases.
102Samuel Imperati, If Freud, Jung, Rogers, and Beck were Mediators, Who Would
the Parties Pick and What are the Mediator's Obligation?, 43 IDAHo L. REv. 645, 648
(2007).
103 Id. at 654-668.
104Id at 655.
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transformation. Still, they would not necessarily agree on facilitation because
Party 1 prefers evaluation to that. They cannot decide.
Introduce the Mediator. At first glance, the three participants do not
agree; none have the same first, second, or third choices. For the sake of
simplicity, suppose that the three of them decide to take a straw poll
following Robert's Rules. They might not use Roberts Rules in practice, but
they'll use some sort of rule. According to Arrow, no rule is immune from
sophisticated negotiators who often attempt to control the agenda, and as a
result, the outcome. Even unsophisticated negotiators do it unintentionally
when they set the agenda without manipulative intent. The following agenda-
setting options might be offered:
* Party 1 's Proposed Agenda:
1) How many prefer facilitation to transformation? Two say,
facilitation.
2) How many prefer evaluation to facilitation? Two say, evaluation.
Result: Evaluation "wins" pursuant to Robert's Rules
* Party 2's Proposed Agenda:
1) How many prefer transformation to evaluation? Two say,
transformation.
2) How many prefer facilitation to evaluation? Two say,
facilitation.
Result: Facilitation "wins" pursuant to Robert's Rules.
* Mediator's Proposed Agenda:
1) The mediator asks how many prefer evaluation to facilitation?
Two say, evaluation.
2) How many prefer transformation to evaluation? Two say,
transformation.
Result: Transformation "wins" pursuant to Robert's Rules. 05
The use of the Mediator's Proposed Agenda violates Standard I of
OMA's Standards: Self-Determination and Standard 3: Impartial Regard.'0o
Indeed, according to OMA's Standards, the mediator would not have a vote,
per se, which reduces the likelihood of cycling in a two-party mediation.
However, not having a vote does not preclude the mediator from influencing
the parties' approach selection. This brings us to the OMA Standards. A
facilitative mediator might have explained the three alternatives first,
105 Now, consider a fourth proposed agenda. 1) How many prefer facilitation to
transformation? Two say, facilitation. 2) How many prefer evaluation to facilitation?
Two say, evaluation. 3) How many prefer transformation to evaluation? Two say,
transformation. The debate continues to "cycle" as noted above.
106 OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6. See also Imperati, supra note
102, at 686-687.
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discussed them, and then sought agreement. However, the mediator would
have to withdraw if the parties could not agree upon a process in a pre-
session. If the mediator could bring them to agreement on using a
transformative approach, even if for some reason one party did not want to
use it, are they better off selecting this approach to continuing in conflict? Is
it ethical for the mediator to do so?
2. Substantive Issues
What are mediators to do when they are discussing substantive
agreements, especially when parties tend to seek and often look for or defer
to the mediator's subject matter 107 expertise? 108 One option is for the
mediator to seek mutual acceptance, which means that the parties can, at
least, live with a proposed alternative, even if it is not their most preferred
outcome.'o Another option is for the mediator to use her subject matter
expertise to explain why one argument or position is more likely to prevail in
front of the ultimate arbiter. To understand how mediators cannot help but be
strategic manipulators, especially when it comes to substantive decisions, let
us analyze this. 1
First, a consensus approach is risky. Any party, even the mediator, can
influence the group to accept an implied outcome, the status quo of going to
trial, by finding every proposal on the table to be unacceptable. This violates
107
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6. Standard V, "Process and
Substantive Competence" states, "Mediators fully and accurately represent their
knowledge, skills, abilities, and limitations. They mediate only when they offer the
desired approach and possess the level of substantive knowledge, skills, and abilities
sufficient to satisfy the participants' reasonable expectations." Id
108Id. The term "subject matter expertise" is often used, but it is an exaggeration.
The authors suggest "subject matter familiarity" better describes the requisite level of
knowledge needed to meet the parties' reasonable expectations unless they prefer a
highly evaluative approach.
109See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES
(2006).
See e.g., Redress, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE http://about.usps.com/what-
we-are-doing/redress/welcome.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (describing the free,
transformative program available to U.S. Postal Service employees). If mediators for the
U.S. Postal Service offer disputants a choice between participating in the free REDRESS
program, or the parties incurring the cost of a mediator who uses a different approach,
they could be seen as dictating the decision by not offering as an alternative a different
approach to mediation for free.
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Arrow's axiom that no single member of a group dictates the outcome."1
This is implied in any mediation. Standard 6: Good-Faith Participation in
OMA's Standards militates against this. It exhorts mediators to "explain to
the participants .. . that they can improve the mediation process and
probability of success when they participate with an open mind throughout
the process."ll 2 That implies not dictating the mediation approach or the
substantive outcome.
Comment 1 encourages mediators to "promote honesty and candor" and
to clarify for participants that the mediator is not a guarantor of participants'
good faith. 113 Coordinating expectations on the merits of agreeing to a
mediation process versus not mediating has value. It carries little force
however, when a party does not participate in good faith.
Comment 2 encourages mediators to "discuss with the participants any
concerns regarding Good-Faith Participation and the impact of these
concerns on the process and the mediator's Impartial Regard."ll 4 Comment 2
allows mediators to withdraw from the process when they feel their ability to
demonstrate impartial regard has been compromised, imposing a cost on the
participants who fail to participate in good faith by returning them to the
status quo. Every party accepts this risk simply by agreeing to talk about
engaging in mediation; in practice, that tends to happen.
Second, by the same reasoning, assuming that the parties agree upon
mediation, a mediator with expertise or access to confidential information or
both could, in theory, albeit with great ethical risk, induce a substantive
agreement that might not achieve the level of "I can live with that." Suppose
the mediator has legal expertise that the parties or attorneys do not and the
mediator realizes they are considering an agreement far less equitable for one
party than if they go to trial. This puts the mediator in the position, ethics
aside, of preferring arguably no agreement, and, potentially, being able to set
the agenda to secure it. Should the parties accept the risk of the mediator
behaving in this manner?
OMA's Standards recognize the risk and seek to minimize it by setting
out clearly defined expectations of mediator behavior. Comment 6 on
Standard 2, Informed Consent, directs mediators to "make participants aware
of the importance of consulting with other professionals to help them
Ill
JOHN BONNER, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE: AN ELEMENTARY
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CHANGE 62 (1986).
112 OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at std. 6.
113 Id. at std. V11, cmt. 1.
114 Id. at std. VII, cmt. 2.
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exercise Informed Consent and Self-Determination."'" Mediators' predictive
legal expertise, if they have it, is less influential when the parties are
represented by attorneys, but what if they are not and the parties select an
"evaluative" approach? At a minimum, if parties have access to attorneys,
mediators should advise the parties about the benefits of relying on their
attorneys' advice. Mediators who prefer a substantive outcome risk violating
Standard 3,116 Impartial Regard, if they act on that preference.
Third, if mediators gain information that helps them discern a basis on
which the parties can reach agreement, not doing something risks the parties
disagreeing, which is what most parties and mediators want to avoid.
Identifying a single dimension ("interest" in the vernacular) underlying the
parties' positions that they both care about more than their espoused
positions is generally an acceptable mediator tactic to induce parties to
reorder their preferences. The mediator reframes the problem so that a
possible solution exists where one seems impossible before the refraining.
Economics treats individual preferences as given and, in that sense,
invariant. If the parties cannot change their preferences, the process might
well lead to no agreement or to cycling from one proposal to another. The
mediator's tactic works because it violates an economist's assumption about
the behavior of rational individuals participating in a collective choice. Most
parties might agree that the risk associated with this tactic -a form of
manipulation-is benign or worth it to reach an agreement. In contrast,
parties might not agree that the risk of another form of manipulation is so
benign or worth it to reach an agreement: granting a mediator the latitude to
induce cycling so as to increase their decision-making costs until they
succumb to exhaustion and revise their preferences." 7
Using information about the parties' different interests to help bridge
gaps is another effective mediator tactic and likely a manipulation the parties
would allow or even expect. For example, suppose a mediator learns that
Party 1 prefers alternative "A" over "B" because of its cash value while Party
2 prefers "B" over "A" because of the impact Party 2 perceives it will have
on his or her reputation, something Party 1 is less concerned about in this
case. This could become the basis for an agreement, such as agreeing to "A"
in exchange for including a confidentiality clause.
115Id. at std. II, cmt. 6.
116
Id. at std. III.
117
Jeffrey Makoff & Jessica Grynberg, "Private Caucusing" in Civil Pretrial
Mediations, MEDIATE.COM (Nov. 2013), http://www.mediate.com/articles/MakoffJl.cfm
(showing how in practice, mediation participants anticipate that caucusing can lead to
mediator manipulation in service of securing a deal-in fact, they plan their negotiation
strategy accordingly by employing tactics such as anchoring and puffing).
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This violates one of Arrow's axioms about collective choice: only order
of preference, not intensity of preference, matters.118 Indeed, intensity of
preference matters. It creates opportunities for the mediator to help the
parties explore solutions based upon their different intensities of
preference."'9 This helps establish relatedness while encouraging the parties'
needs for competence and autonomy. Standards of ethical practice would not
preclude this form of intervention if the parties agree to it and the mediator
avoids violating impartial regard by not helping one party over another.
These are heresthetic techniques because the mediator restructures the
decision consistent with the parties' true interests. Compared to the tactical
disadvantages associated with the party sharing the same information directly
with the opposing party, a mediator can more readily help the parties reveal
this. In neither case do the bases for the initial disagreements disappear, but
the result is agreement. In both cases, consistent with Arrow's concerns,
either party has the potential to act in a disingenuous manner when revealing
his or her interests as in a game of poker, influencing the final outcome.
Standard 6 on Good-Faith Participation discourages, but does not guarantee it
will not happen.
Particularly where parties with multiple interests underlying their
positions engage in mediation, a variant on this mediator tactic is to reduce
the number of issues by, for example, letting the parties vent over past
indiscretions by the other party. Alternatively, the mediator encourages
parties to acknowledge committing a past indiscretion, if not to apologize for
it. This allows the parties to "get past" or eliminate historical "baggage," and
focus on a smaller number of forward-looking issues whose ease of
resolution increase the potential for "settlement" or "resolution." The former
is acquiescence and the latter is acceptance. The fewer the issues, the less
likely that the conditions exist for a paradox. The same holds for reducing the
dimensionality of the decision-making by eliciting agreement among the
parties on a compact, weighted set of criteria by which they will evaluate
numerous proposed outcomes.
The ability of mediators to identify common interests and to exploit
differences in intensity of preference; to help the parties craft intermediate
alternatives between the simple paired "I win/you lose" choice; to reframe
issues and underlying interests or their number; and to introduce decision
tables explains some of the attractions of mediation. These and other
118
See JOHN BONNER, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE: AN ELEMENTARY
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CHOICE 59-60 (1986).
See generally WISE DECIDER, http://wisedecider.net/user (last visited Feb. 24,
2014) (providing members access to decision tables that help with a wide range of
decisions).
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heresthetic tools help groups make collective choices. Arguably, they are
inconsistent with the Self Determination Standard.
The issue for the mediator is whether she has an ethical obligation to
explain this dynamic to the parties before they decide to mediate. However,
explaining the implications of Arrow's work would make all of them unsure
about participating in mediation. We can do nothing or we can change the
mediator standards to encourage mediators to explain this dynamic to the
parties.
By creating expectations for all parties about acceptable behaviors,
standards of practice give the mediator and the parties a degree of confidence
that mediators will not abuse heresthetics, but are we giving sufficient
information to the parties to ensure their informed consent? Perhaps mediator
standards should require the mediator to explain what heuristic tools he uses
during mediation, when, and how.
B. Rhetorical Tactics
* 1. Theory
As Booth puts it, "rhetoric makes realities," the classic distinctions
among three kinds of "rhetoric-made" realities go to the heart of the
mediator's craft:
* Forensic: "attempts to change what we see as the truth about the
past," which is what mediators do to help the parties move from finding fault
to finding solutions (e.g. the mediator might ask party A whether it is
possible that party B's intent was something other than nefarious);
* Epideictic: "attempts to reshape views of the present," which is what
mediators do to help the parties overcome misunderstanding, see the issues
from different perspectives, and find common ground (e.g. the mediator
might pose a choice to Party A - fix blame or fix the problem); and
* Deliberative "attempts to make the future," which is what mediators
intend to achieve (e.g. the mediator might posit to either party that it would
be better to build a relationship than to fix blame).120
As opposed to heresthetics, where the rules matter, here, words and
images reshape the past, present or future, reshaping "the personae of
those. . . who accept the new realities. You and I are remade as we encounter
the remakings." 121 Rhetoric does not necessarily elicit new information,
120 WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC: THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE
COMMUNICATION 16-17 (2004).
121 Id. at 17.
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which often is how a mediator adds value. Rhetoric has to do with changing
people's minds by the presentation of information the parties may already
have. 122
To Aristotle, deliberative oratory is the basis for community.' 23 Rhetoric
capitalizes upon the human need for relatedness. Rather than persuading, in
the sense of getting someone to do something they otherwise do not want to
do, rhetoric is about a speaker (qua mediator) finding the best possible
arguments. This tool works so long as the speaker addresses the concerns of
the listeners (parties) and the decision to act is within the listeners' power. 124
If used ethically, rhetoric capitalizes upon the human need for competence
and autonomy.
The tactical arguments a rhetorician chooses include 1) syllogisms, 2)
deductive arguments with three propositions, and 3) arguments by example,
which are variations of enthymemes. An enthymeme is an argument that not
only leads to a logical conclusion, but also leads to a decision through
individual volition. Examples include summarizing points with a forceful
climax (accumulation), arguing a topic from both sides to help parties gain a
deeper under-standing of an issue (dissoi logoi), and repeating the same point
with different but parallel words and referents to emphasize its significance
(exergasia).
Aristotle125divides rhetorical arguments into three not mutually exclusive
categories in terms of their ability to appeal to an audience and move it to
action:
* Logos: an appeal based on logic, or to the intellect, can include
theory, statistics, and expert opinion. When a mediator invokes logic, it can
stimulate a change in position by satisfying a party's psychological need to
feel competent. Such an argument may be particularly effective in helping
parties solve coordination problems.
* Ethos: an appeal based on ethics, such as the credibility and
trustworthiness of the speaker, is a determination made by the audience. By
invoking, for example, virtue and goodness, the mediator speaks to an
accepted communal value and can stimulate a positional change by satisfying
a party's need to feel related and of good character. That may be particularly
effective in helping parties solve enforcement problems.
122 See Enriqueta Aragones et al., Rhetoric and Analogies (Penn Inst. for Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13-039, 2013).
123
WENDY OLMSTED, RHETORIC: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 11 (2006).
124Id. at 13-14.
125 See generally ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CivIC DISCOURSE 37-38,
(George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).
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* Pathos: an appeal based on sympathy, emotion, and feeling without
necessarily analyzing the rationale, can include figurative or vivid language
and emotional narratives. By invoking, for example, anger, fear, empathy, or
compassion to connect with personal experiences, the mediator can stimulate
a change in position by satisfying a party's need to feel autonomous. Such an
argument might seem to be particularly effective in helping parties solve
division problems by normalizing their reactions. By allowing parties to feel
reasonable and heard, the chances increase that they will let go of any
counterproductive baggage that inhibits their agreeing. 12 6
The theory of rhetoric is consistent with SDT because both incorporate
competence, relatedness, and autonomy as motivations for decision-making.
SDT and CCT both have extensive theoretical and empirical support for
their explanatory powers. Rhetoric is primarily theoretical, but behavioral
economics buttressed by neuroscience provides empirical support for it. 12 7
Analogously to heresthetics, choices cannot be presented neutrally; any
presentation can influence the decision maker's choice. 128 Restated, a
mediator can use rhetoric to create or inhibit self-determination.
2. Tools
Rhetoric and behavioral economics presume that psychological biases
abound and that people use heuristics to simplify their decision-making.
Rhetoric can exploit this in both the positive and negative senses of the term.
We cannot establish a one-to-one correspondence between every rhetorical
technique and every finding documented by behavioral economists.
However, we can find substantial correspondence, particularly with respect
to rhetorical tactics, that mediators commonly use and that are designed to
help the parties, not to trick them.
One example of such a rhetorical tool is this: rationality presumes that
people make identical choices over identical options, regardless of how the
options are described. 12 9 In reality, people perceive outcomes in terms of
126
Id.
127
See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMos TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982); Richard Birke, Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination of
Scientific Innovations and Practical Applications, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 477,
501-23 (2010).
128 Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23
MARKETING LETTERS 487, 488 (2012).
129 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions. 59 J. Bus. S251, S253 (1986).
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value defined over gains and losses relative to some reference point that they
usually intuit and can only vaguely articulate as in, "it just feels right." Gains
and losses display diminishing sensitivity (i.e., the difference between $10
and $20 seems bigger than the difference between $100 and $110), and
losing a fixed amount hurts more than gaining the same amount. "0 Suppose a
disputant frames an argument or a proposal in terms of capturing a potential
gain. A mediator might summarize the proposal as made, or reframe it using
words that describe it as avoiding a potential loss, which is more likely to
induce, or otherwise persuade, the other side to accept the proposal, even if it
involves making a concession. 3 1
Alternatively, suppose a disputant were to make a series of proposals
with multiple costs and benefits. People often employ a type of mental
accounting that assigns value into two categories: good (revenues) or bad
(expenditures). 132 short, money is not fungible, as classic rationality
assumes. "Money in one mental category is not a perfect substitute for
money in another ....
A mediator's decision to pool the proposals into a package rather than
deal with them serially is a heresthetic technique. Summarizing them in
terms of their total net impact rather than presenting them one-by-one is a
rhetorical technique (akin to accumulation). It can influence the disputants'
perceptions and, hence, their decisions. A closely related rhetorical tactic
mediators employ for the same reason is to re-order the elements of a
proposed package so the listeners hear first an element they probably like,
then one not so likable, and closing with one they will really like.134 An
analogous rhetorical tactic involves the National Coalition Building
Institute's135 "umbrella question" technique, where the mediator teases out
the different interests of the parties, establishes their legitimacy, pools them,
and asks how all can be satisfied while achieving a collective goal.
130Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAv. DEC. MAKING 183, 185
(1999).
131
See generally AMos TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Loss Aversion in Riskless
Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECoN. 1039 (1991).
132Id. at 184.
1
3 3 Id. at 185.
'34 This tactic relies on the concepts of primacy and recency as we tend to react more
strongly, and thus are overly influenced by things we hear first and last. See ROBIN
HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 55 (2d ed., 1987).
See generally NATIONAL COALITION BUILDING INSTITUTE, http://ncbi.org (last
visited Mar. 23, 2014). Mediators structure umbrella questions as follows: "How can we
achieve [list party A's interests] while at the same time addressing [party B's interests],
thereby achieving [list interests common to A and to B]?"
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B. Mediator Ethical Challenges with Heuristics and Rhetoric
In sum, rhetorical tactics, like heresthetic ones, impart power to
mediators. Every mediator action exercises some form of power whether the
mediator wants to acknowledge it or not. With all of the opportunities for
mediators to influence the process and outcome, even unintentionally, how is
it possible for parties in conflict to engage in mediation, motivated by their
pursuit of personal autonomy, competence, and relatedness, without
undermining their raison d'etre for participating? The answer is the faith they
place in standards of ethical practices, like OMA's, and the belief that
exercising reasonable discretion will allow the mediator to bring the parties
to an agreement more efficaciously than if they employed alternative
processes. The challenge thus becomes whether the current schema for
ethical practices in mediation are sufficiently detailed and robust to justify
the parties faith in mediation.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: CRAFTING STANDARDS OF
ETHICAL PRACTICE
A. Overview of Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Conclusions
a. The following mediation field's common assertions are arguably
erroneous: A) parties own the outcome; mediators own the
process, and B) mediators have no preferences over outcomes.
b. Mediation works because of a mediator's judicious (ethical)
application of heresthics and rhetoric to serve the participants',
including the mediator's, psychological needs for self-
determination and efficient use of transaction resources.
c. Parties and a mediator who agree on ethical standards of practice
satisfy their intrinsic needs, reinforcing self-determination; solve
a divisible prisoner's dilemma problem at low cost; and mitigate
manipulation.
2. Recommendations
a. Mediators should create robust standards of ethical practice
because that can resolve all three paradoxes.
254
[Vol.29:2 2014]
WHY DOES ANYONE MEDIATE
b. Robust standards of ethical practice should require the mediator
to engage the parties in a pre-negotiation exploration of the
mediator's tools and their potential impact on the process and the
outcome.
c. Parties in mediation should inquire about and agree to the ethical
standards to which the mediator adheres.
d. Mediators should make standards of ethical practice mandatory
to encourage mediation. While mostly aspirational, current
standards reduce the parties' fears by establishing expectations
of reasonable behavior.
e. Mediators should evaluate and implement meaningful
enforcement mechanisms, which are not prevalent in the field,
including the pursuit of disciplinary claims. Should we not hold
ourselves accountable when we violate ethical standards? It is
done in other professions. Thus, mediators who charge a fee
should not be immune from malpractice, but instead, should be
held to the typical professional negligence standard.
Each of the above recommendations is developed below.
First, mediators should create robust, realistic standards of ethical
practice because public standards reduce the costs to the parties of
identifying unacceptable behavior by the mediator. They put the burden on
the mediator to avoid strategic behavior in the form of inappropriate
heresthetic or rhetorical maneuvers, or to use them only when clearly
justified. 136 Standards of ethical practice should validate the parties'
expectations about how the mediation will be conducted, codifying the
reasons why parties could give a mediator a bad reputation.137 If the parties
can discharge a mediator for violating ethical canons, and if mediators by
terminating a mediation self-enforce those canons, ethical canons help solve
the coordination problem, reducing the costs of resolving the prisoner's
dilemma between disputants and the mediator. The parties then have more
internal transaction resources to apply to resolving their substantive dispute.
136
Shapira, supra note 77, at 39-45.
17OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at std. III, cmt. 4. The standard
specifically notes that "[m]ediators should not influence participant decisions because of
the mediator's interest in higher settlement rates, increased fees, or non-participant
pressures from court personnel, program administrators, provider organizations, the
media, the public, or others." Id. This is another example of the requisite level of specific
guidance standards should provide. Making that provision enforceable would provide
even more confidence in the mediation process.
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Beyond serving the parties, standards of ethical practice serve mediators.
Ethical standards help define what it means for a mediator to be autonomous,
competent, and related, just as they serve the purposes of participants who
have the same psychological needs. Not surprisingly, empirical research
finds that the mediators who engage in behaviors associated with reinforcing
their own and the parties' autonomy, competence, and relatedness encourage
trust by the parties in mediators.'3 8
Second, our analysis provides guidance for those who are creating or
revising standards of practice by identifying questions the writers should
address. For example, to secure "High Quality Consent" 39 and "Procedural
Justice," 140 how detailed, if at all, should the mediator explain the
implications of SDT, TRT, and CCT? Standards separating process selection
from outcome, or non-substantive from substantive issues, defy theory and
reality.
Likewise, should mediators take these concepts to the concrete level and
engage the parties in a pre-mediation conversation about how specifically the
mediator is to act or refrain from acting? Topicsl 4 1 could include: 1) Will we
use a transformative, facilitative, evaluative, hybrid, or some other model for
this mediation? What do these terms mean to you? Can the model change,
and, if so, under what circumstances? 2) Should the mediator raise issues,
claims, or defenses? Under what circumstances? 3) Should the mediator offer
opinions? If yes, under what circumstances? 4) To what extent, if any, should
the mediator use information received confidentially as a tactic to bring
parties together? 5) Should the mediator tell the parties what heuristic and
rhetorical tools he will use, when and how?
Third, potential users should inquire as to what ethical standards, if any,
a potential mediator adheres to before they agree to mediation.14 2 Transaction
138 See generally Jean Poitras, What Makes Parties Trust Mediators?, 25
NEGOTIATION J. 307 (2009).
139
John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839, 857 (1997).
140
Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got
to do with it? 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 817 (2001).
'4'
Sam Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and Stylistic
Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 703, 742 (1997).
142
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6. Standard X, Mediation Practice,
Comment 13 states, "Mediators should provide these Core Standards to the mediation
participants as soon as practical." Id. The authors suggest this is an example of the
requisite level of specific guidance standards should provide. General philosophical
principles are not always sufficient to give participants the full disclosure necessary for
informed consent and self-determination. Making such provisions enforceable would lead
to even more confidence in mediation.
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Resource Theory predicts that parties in conflict will use a third party if they
believe that the benefits exceed the costs, including the risks we have
identified. They must first agree to mediate, believing that the process will
minimize the risks of process and outcome manipulation, usually by the other
parties. Indeed, they might believe that it will because they view the mediator
as the guardian of process fairness. This could be nalve, albeit preferable to
engaging in alternative processes. Mediators are not neutral, even if they act
with impartial regard, because they have points of view, especially about the
process, but they should avoid acting on them to the substantive disadvantage
of the parties. Mediators who adhere to ethical standards that do not speak to
these concerns to the satisfaction of the parties, or who do not adhere to any
ethical standards, should give the parties pause about engaging with that
mediator.
Fourth, standards of ethical practice should be mandatory, providing the
potential for a robust check and balance system enforced by professional
associations or the courts. Our analysis supports the need for something
beyond reputation effects to enforce everyone's expectations that mediation
can be successful while allowing all of the parties to be self-determining.
Before reaching the substantive issues and whether everyone will abide by
terms of any agreement, the parties must solve a preliminary problem about
the legitimacy of the process and the mediation approach they will use. The
key is the enforceability of mediator standards of ethical practice.
Fifth, with robust, value-based, realistic and mandatory standards of
practice in place, mediators should evaluate and implement meaningful
enforcement mechanisms, which are not prevalent in the field.14 3 This step
introduces the matter of a complaint process and the potential for a mediator
malpractice claim. If a mediator behaves unethically, the mediator likely
committed malpractice, assuming there were damages caused by the error or
omission. Mediators can be guilty of malpractice without being unethical if
their behavior falls below the standard of care in the profession, which
presents the prima facie case for mediators to create standards of care.
Oregon mediators are immune, however, "unless the act or omission was
made or done in bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a
willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another."'44 A
mediator merely negligent is immune.
143
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of
American: From the Formal to the Informal to the 'Semi-Formal', in REGULATING
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND AcCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419,444 (Felix
Steffek & Hannes Unberath eds., 2013).
144 OR. REV. STAT. § 36.2 10 (2013).
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Thus, mediators who charge and receive a feel45 should not be immune
from malpractice, but instead, should be held to the typical professional
negligence standard, especially when malpractice insurance is readily
available.146 States or self-governing organizations like OMA could also
enforce ethical standards of practice by holding mediators accountable when
they violate ethical standards as is done in other professions.14 7 As it stands,
OMA's complaint process is voluntary and non-binding, which on our
analysis using SDT, TRT and CCT, is insufficient. Features of mediation that
make it so attractive, such as party self-determination, procedural choice, and
confidentiality, create informational deficits that justify licensure.14 8
B. Improvement Process Plan
At a bar association continuing legal education class,149 a federal trial
judge and a jury consultant explored how litigators can best present their
cases to juries. They explained several rhetorical tools and cognitive
biases,'50 with suggestions on how trial attorneys can use them or overcome
them to their persuasive advantage. Examples included: A) "Don't Bury the
Lead," meaning lead with your point, and then, backfill with the train of
logic and facts that got you there, not the other way around; and B) "Don't
take the bait," meaning never directly respond to your opponents framing of
'45
OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 6. Standard X, Mediation Practice,
Comment 8 states, "Mediators who charge a fee are encouraged to have malpractice
insurance." Id. The authors suggest the time has come to mandate insurance, not just
encourage it. See State by State, Mandatory Malpractice Disclosure Gathers Steam,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar _leader/
2003 04/2804/malpractice.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). It is a tenet of
professionalism that clients are the first priority and they need to be protected.
146 Pinkham Insurance Program, ASSOCIATION FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
http://www.acrnet.org/Page.aspx?id=664 (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
'47
See History of Mediation in Oregon: Certification, Licensure, and Enhancing
Mediator Competency, OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION (Feb. 4, 2014, 2:30 PM),
http://www.omediate.org/pgl122.cfm (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
148But see Felix Steffek et al., Guide for Regulating Dispute Resolution (GRDR):
Principles and Comments, in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO
JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 13, 25-26 (Felix Steffek & Hannes Unberath eds., 2013).
'49 Hon. Michael Simon & Christopher Dominic, Science of the Mind: How Jurors,
Judges and Other Key Decision Makers Really Think, MULTNOMAH BAR ASSOCIATION
(Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.mbabar.org/education/watch-archived-cle-webcast/science-
of-the-mind.
150 Kendra Cherry, What is a Cognitive Bias? Mental Mistakes and Errors,
ABOUT.COM http://psychology.about.com/od/cindex/fl/What-Is-a-Cognitive-Bias.htm.
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the story; always reframe it by telling your story. These tactics were
enthusiastically received by the audience.
Over the years, lawyers have discussed a duty of zealous advocacy
(representation) on behalf of their clients.' 5 Mediators have no such duty; in
fact, their duties are to display neutrality/impartial regard. This is why
mediators, regardless of their profession of origin, should struggle with the
resulting ethical issue associated with using rhetorical tactics, while the
lawyers do not. It also might explain why lawyers representing parties in
mediation or acting as a mediator can be desensitized to the appropriate or
inappropriate use of rhetoric-it seems so familiar, and therefore, so
acceptable to them. This is a "cognitive bias." It is called, "Mere Exposure
Effect," the tendency for parties to express undue liking for things merely
because they are familiar to them. 152 This justifies training for everyone
engaged in mediation.s 3
At a conference on conflict management,154 practitioners, largely made
up of as psychologists and social workers, objected to mandatory standards
of ethical practice and competency. The people (presumably lawyers) who
write laws, they said, would write standards to exclude non-lawyers from
serving as mediators. Nothing in OMA's standards would do so. No matter.
The irony should not be lost: mediators with different backgrounds who find
their legitimate interests to be in conflict not only eschew an authoritative
statutory process for setting standards that might benefit their profession,
they evidently fail to consider mediation as a basis for crafting a statutory
solution. It seems we cannot even resolve these issues within our own field.
Perhaps, we should convene a public policy facilitation, invite mediation
users, and see what they think. For the good of potential clients, mediators
should practice what they preach: full disclosure, informed consent, and the
promotion of self-determination.
151See Sylvia Stevens, Whither Zeal?, OREGON STATE BAR (Jul. 2005), http://www.
osbar.org/publications/bulletin/05jul/barcounsel.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
152 Gillian Fournier, Mere Exposure Effect, PSYCHCENTRAL, http://psychcentral.
com/encyclopedia/2009/mere-exposure-effect/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
'53 For a beta version, user-friendly summary of cognitive biases, see Eric Fernandez,
A Visual Study Guide to Cognitive Biases, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO,
http://www.cs.unm.edu/-jmk/cognitive-bias.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
Interestingly, numerous mediator impasse-breaking techniques "work" because they
attend to the cognitive biases of the parties.
154 See generally 26th Annual IACM 2014 Conference, INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (Jul. 2013), http://www.iacm-
conflict.org/sites/default/files/2013_IACMConferenceProgramWeb.pdf.
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The authors have observed and participated in robust debates, probably
unconsciously influenced by "deformation professionalle," 155 over what
profession(s) of origin "own" mediation. Moreover, let us not forget the
internecine debates about facilitative-transformative-evaluative mediation
approaches. With the playful hope of provoking more friendly discussion,
dare we get complacent, if attorneys, acting as advocates or mediators, are
desensitized to dangers of rhetorical tactics, they have a blind spot when they
become mediators. Parties should be cautious, unless, of course, mediators
must be licensed and licensure requires training that re-sensitizes them to the
implications of using rhetorical tactics. Conversely, mediators from other
professions of origin should be sensitized to their blind spot-the fact that
laws are nothing more than society's codification of fairness norms
surrounding appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Laws are based upon
commonly accepted values and needs-"interest" in mediation vernacular.
If nothing else, the authors hope this article motivates more discussion about
what mediators should understand before they mediate and what parties
should know before they agree to mediate "on faith."'56 So, what are we
going to do to improve the wonderful field of mediation? At a minimum,
mediators should critically explore the dissonance between what we say at
conferences/trainings and the ethical and practical impact of what we
actually do in the field. This requires self-reflective, and dare we say,
"transformative" training to transparently operationalize the core principles
of mediation.
'55
This is the tendency to look at things according to the conventions of one's own
professions, forgetting any broader point of view. See ALEXIs CARREL, L'HOMME, CET
INCONNU 43 (1935).
156We are not using the "decoy effect" cognitive bias. That is the tactic where the
preferences for either option A or B changes in favor of option B when option C is
presented, which is similar to option B but in no way better. See generally Shankar
Vedantam, The Decoy Effect, or How to Win an Election, THE WASHINGTON PosT (Apr.
2, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/01/AR20070
40100973.html. The mediation field should explore training mediators and parties even if
it decides to keep the current ethical and enforcement constructs.
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